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Herbert Moxon, a victim of the "Bolshevisation"
of the
Communist Party of Australia
Introduction
By Bob Gould
Beris Penrose is a historian who lives in Melbourne, and
whose politics are in the International Socialist tradition. She has
also written some extremely useful articles on occupational health and
safety.
This article about the internal life of the Australian Communist Party
after its initial Stalinisation and during the "third period"
complements an article
by Barbara Curthoys, which describes the initial Stalinisation of
the the CPA, incorporating material from the Soviet archives.
This article has current relevance in light of the current upheaval in
the Democratic Socialist Perspective, in which the DSP's former
leadership has been deposed and the new DSP majority has, in this case
quite voluntarily, adopted a form of ultraleftism that is in some ways
very similar to the ulttraleftism of the CPA's "third period" between
1929 and 1935.
Herbert Moxon, a victim of the "Bolshevisation" of the
Communist Party of Australia
By Beris Penrose
Much has been written about the factional dispute within the Communist
Party of Australia [CPA] during 1928-1929 that culminated in the
removal of Jack Kavanagh and his supporters from positions of
authority, and the installation of a new leadership under Herbert
Moxon, Lance Sharkey and later J.B. Miles.1 However, much less has been
written about the crucial first two years of Moxon and Sharkey's
control of the CPA even though these years represented a turning point
for the party.
These two years were a period of intense machinations by the new
leadership, first against Kavanagh and his supporters, and later
against Moxon himself. But more importantly, in these two years the CPA
underwent two major changes that would dramatically alter its character
for decades to come. The first was the abandonment by the leadership of
an independent assessment of the Australian political and economic
situation. Instead the party implemented directives from the Communist
International [Comintern] that bore little relevance to Australian
conditions. The second was the restructuring of the CPA so that it
resembled the Stalinised Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU].
This entailed the establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus, which
inhibited free debate inside the party and vilified, ostracised and
expelled communist dissidents from its ranks.
This article seeks to examine why the post-Kavanagh leadership was
dedicated to these changes, how the changes were accomplished so
successfully in two years, and why the upheavals that followed the
removal of Jack Kavanagh from leadership in 1929 were not repeated when
Herbert Moxon was removed from leadership in 1932 in a similar fashion.
The international adoption of the "third period" theory
From July to September 1928 the Comintern held its sixth congress, at
which it proclaimed that world capitalism was entering its "third
period" — a new period of crises, wars and revolutions. The first
period encompassed the years of revolutionary upheaval from 1917-1923,
and the second the period of stabilisation and economic expansion from
1924-1928. But this new period was to be capitalism's final phase.
According to Russian leader Vyacheslav Molotov, there could be "no
fourth period for the third ends in revolution".2
With uprisings looming, western communists were warned against forming
alliances with the leadership of the social democratic, or reformist,
parties and trade unions, which would sabotage the revolutions to
preserve capitalism. By protecting a disintegrating system, reformists
paved the way for fascism — the bourgeoisie's last futile attempt to
preserve its power. Hence, the Comintern argued, reformism and fascism
were twins and it labelled reformists as "social fascists", the
foremost enemies of the working class. The most sinister of all "social
fascists" were the left-wing reformists. By professing opposition to
the policies of their conservative colleagues, they delayed the
disintegration of capitalism because they presented workers with an
illusory "radical" alternative to communism. This ultimately served to
protect capitalism from revolutionary upheavals. At the CPA's tenth
congress in April 1931 it was unanimously resolved that:
The various social democratic and
labor parties throughout the world
have become the worst enemies of the working class, the most effective
weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie for crushing the working class
[and] Lang and ... the Left Social Fascists constitute the most
dangerous enemies of the working class.
District committees were urged "to carry on the most relentless fight
against the pseudo-lefts in the camp of Social Fascism as the worst
enemies of the working class".3
Although the Comintern parties enthusiastically embraced the third
period theory, there was little empirical evidence of impending
revolutions. In the four years prior to the congress, the influence of
many international parties had actually declined. The most important
event in the western labour movement prior to the congress, the British
general strike of 1926, had ended in defeat and demoralisation. In its
aftermath, membership of the British party fell from 10,730 in October
1926 to 3200 by March 1928. By 1927 trade union membership in Britain
had fallen below five million for the first time since 1916 and the
number
of unions affiliated with the British Trade Union Council had
plummeted.4
Likewise, the most significant struggle in the east, the revolutionary
upheavals in China from 1925-1927, ended in disaster almost
annihilating the communist party, trade unions and peasant
associations.5
Nor did Australia appear a likely candidate for an
imminent revolution. Since the Comintern's fifth congress in 1924 party
membership had progressively declined along with its influence in the
labour movement.
It is more likely that the third period theory, rather than reflecting
a radicalisation of the labour movements around the world, was a
product of a factional struggle within the CPSU, which was triggered by
the economic and political crisis gripping the USSR at the time. A
combination of years of economic isolation from the west following the
revolutions of February and October 1917, as well as the decline of the
country's industrial base during the subsequent civil war, and the
failure to develop the USSR's economy, precipitated the rural crisis of
1927-28.
When peasants refused to sell their desperately needed grain to the
state, opinions within the CPSU leadership over how to respond became
sharply divided. Nikolai Bukharin, head of the Comintern from
1926-28, advocated concessions to induce the peasants to sell their
grain to the state. Joseph Stalin favoured seizing it by physical
force, but his policy was extremely unpopular. The forced requisitions
in the spring of 1928 provoked unrest in the countryside, which
resulted in the
secret police quelling 150 sporadic peasant rebellions in the first
half
of that year.6
Stalin could not risk Bukharin using his position in the
Comintern to create a faction in the international parties that would
be critical of the regime's struggle against the peasantry. The
campaign to break the rural crisis in Russia necessitated a campaign
against Bukharin.7
Over a period of months before the sixth congress,
Bukharin's authority was systematically undermined within the party,
state and Comintern. Previously, he had championed alliances between
communist and reformist parties, believing that international
revolutions were unlikely in the present period.
If Bukharin was to be
discredited, his theories had to be as well. Consequently, the
Comintern replaced alliances between communists and reformists with
uncompromising hostility between the two. It also declared that the
period of capitalist stabilisation was over and the world had entered a
new period of imminent revolutions. Helmut Gruber said of the third
period theory:
More than any previous policy of
the Comintern it was
the outgrowth of the continuing power struggle among Russian leaders
and factions, whose final outcome established the hegemony of Stalin in
Russia and in the communist movement. 8
The acceptance by western
communists of the super-optimistic third period analysis of imminent
revolution, despite the knowledge that many of their own labour
movements were experiencing demoralisation, can be understood by a
number of factors. The most important was that the stature of the
Soviet leadership, already immense due to the events of 1917, became
inflated with every setback experienced by western communists. Since
the Russians had been the only ones to lead a successful revolution, an
aura of infallibility began to surround the Soviet leadership.9 This
was reinforced by the delegates' total acceptance of the new theory of
socialism in one country, itself an outgrowth of a previous struggle by
Stalin against the CPSU's left wing under Leon Trotsky. Because
socialism was being built in the USSR under Stalin, the primary goal of
international communists became the protection of the Soviet Union. As
E.H. Carr explained, with the adoption of socialism in one country,
world revolution “was no longer thought of as the primary condition of
the survival of the Soviet regime. Socialism in one country had taken
its place”.10
The political immaturity of the Comintern delegates reinforced the
tendency for non-Soviet communists to defer to the CPSU leaders.
Roughly half of the 500 delegates had never attended a Comintern
congress before, and only four of the delegates had been to all six
congresses.11
It was repeatedly impressed upon the delegates that
unanimity amongst Soviet and foreign communists was imperative for the
USSR's survival. Because of this no disagreements were raised openly at
the sixth Comintern congress and there was little real debate.12
CPA hesitates to adopt the third period analysis
Like the majority of
communist leaders, Jack Kavanagh agreed with the Comintern's third
period analysis. Resolutions from the party's eighth congress in
December 1928 indicate that the leadership believed the labour movement
was entering a decisive period. As the economic depression hit,
employers would try to drive down wages and increase working hours, and
reformist union officials would be too weak to resist. Therefore,
communists resolved to challenge their domination of the unions through
communist-led rank and file opposition groups affiliated to the
revamped Militant Minority Movement [MMM].
The party's analysis of the ALP also reflected the Comintern's third
period theory. It was claimed that Labor had "abandoned the class
struggle and the defence of the class interests of the proletariat" and
instead was protecting Australian capitalism. Labor had exhausted its
program of social reform and could not offer the working class any
relief in the coming period of political destabilisation. Consequently,
workers would break their ties with the ALP and join the CPA.13
While the resolutions from the party congress embodied much of the
theory of imminent revolution and reformist betrayal, the leadership
under Kavanagh also made some modifications to the Comintern policy in
an attempt to adapt the third period doctrine to the specific
conditions facing the Australian labour movement at the time.
Consequently, the eighth CPA congress did not demand a complete break
with "social fascists". On the contrary, it adopted a complex position
on the issue of communist electoral support for the ALP.
It was believed that the majority of workers in Queensland and
Victoria, having experienced Labor in office, were dissatisfied and
were moving away from reformism. But in NSW workers still maintained
their loyalty towards Labor. Reflecting this uneven development, the
party resolved that in Queensland, communists should stand as
candidates against the ALP in the May 1929 state election, while in the
federal election and the NSW state election, due later in 1929, the CPA
would call on workers to vote Labor. The experience of Labor in office
was seen as an invaluable lesson for workers who, through their own
"bitter experience, through repeated disillusionment", would abandon
reformism for the communist alternative.14 Nor was work with left wing
union officials totally excluded. In fact, during the timber workers'
dispute in 1929 Kavanagh worked closely with the NSW Labor Council as
chair of its disputes committee.
Intervention by the ECCI
Kavanagh and his supporters on the central
executive committee [CEC], in applying the general outlines of third
period analysis to specific circumstances of Australia, did not
understand that the Comintern prohibited even qualified support for
"social fascists". Soon after the congress the party was consumed by
bitter factionalism as a section of the leadership led by Herbert Moxon
and Lance Sharkey demanded a thorough implementation of Comintern
policy. The consequent political polarisation within the party has been
well documented and its most noteworthy aspect was intervention of the
Executive Committee of the Comintern [ECCI] on the side of Moxon and
Sharkey. Twice in September 1929 it directed Kavanagh and the CEC to
overturn the congress decisions.15
The CEC reasoned that the labour movement would suffer if the non-Labor
parties were elected in NSW and federally. Already the conservatives
who had won office in Queensland in May 1929 had begun cancelling
workers' awards and their federal counterparts were threatening to do
the same if elected. The CEC explained:
Because of the great variation in
the character and organisation of the
various state branches of the Labor Party and the varying extent of the
disillusionment with Labor governments experienced by the masses, it is
obvious that the Communist Party cannot have one uniform tactic to be
applied in elections throughout Australia. 16
Further cables were urgently sent from Moxon and Sharkey to the ECCI,
which again cautioned Kavanagh that "a victory for the Labor Party
would strengthen illusions among the masses of workers and encourage
liquidationist tendencies among Party members".17 The CEC was directed
by Moscow to stand candidates against Labor as they had done in
Queensland. When Kavanagh refused to do this, the ECCI denounced his
behaviour as a "glaring example of right deviation deserving the
severest condemnation".18
Such a pronouncement from Moscow signified Kavanagh's
political death, as it was asserted at the time that "right
deviationism" was the principal internal danger facing communist
parties around the world.
Debate over the relationship between the CPA and the ALP consumed the
party for a year and in the lead up to its ninth congress in December
1929 Kavanagh brought the controversy into the pages of the Workers
Weekly. This would be the last open debate in the party press.
For Moxon and his collaborators the dispute was not simply a
disagreement over tactics. They sincerely believed that the fate of the
impending revolution hinged on the outcome of the leadership struggle.
They claimed that the Comintern "correctly estimated that until the
Right danger is smashed and the parties of the Comintern adopt a single
line throughout the world, ie, the independent role of the CP, the
majority of the working class cannot be organised by and to the
Communist Party".19
In Australia, support for the ALP was the "most
glaring recent example of the utter repudiation of the single world
line of the revolutionary working class". Given the magnitude of the
world crisis and growing threats of a second imperialist war,
Australian communists had to sever all ties with the ALP. Workers were
breaking with Labor in Queensland and could only be won to communism if
the party had "bold" policies. Procrastination by the CPA could lead to
fascism.20
Kavanagh and his supporters, for their part, believed there was no
evidence of a revolution developing in Australia. The new line,
therefore, was more relevant to Europe. Kavanagh insisted it was
necessary to analyse and understand the peculiarities of the class
struggle in each country in order to assess the suitability of any
Comintern line. To do otherwise was, he claimed, "not Leninism but
romanticism".21
Although the third period theory coincided with a series of colossal
battles between labour and capital in Australia, these were defensive
struggles as workers resisted attempts to push back established
conditions. They resulted in devastating defeats for workers, including
the sugar and railway workers in Queensland (1927), the waterside
workers nationally (1928), the timber workers in NSW and Victoria
(1929) and the coal miners in northern NSW (1929). Rather than spurring
workers on to revolution, the defeats led to a dramatic decline in
strike levels. Statistics for Queensland alone confirm that days lost
in strike action fell from 428,135 in 1927 to a mere 3443 by 1929.
Similarly, the number of workers involved in strike activity fell
spectacularly from 30,234 in 1927 to 3628 by 1928, and continued to
fall until, in 1930, only 1631 Queensland workers were involved in
strikes.22
But the tide was against Kavanagh. A new breed of communist leaders,
whose loyalty to Moscow was absolute, was being promoted by the
Comintern. Well before the internal dispute in the CPA, leader of
Russia's left opposition, Leon Trotsky, had noted that the Comintern
"removes, sweeps away, deforms, and tramples underfoot all that is
independent, ideologically firm, and inflexible. It needs conformists.
And it finds them without much difficulty, groups them together, and
arms them".23
Not surprisingly, Kavanagh and his supporters were removed from office
at the ninth party congress in December 1929 and Moxon and Sharkey took
control, with Moxon as general secretary. J.D. Blake later stated that
without intervention from Moscow:
the outcome might have been a
little different, in view of the forces
involved. The internal conflict might have been more prolonged, and as
a result the leadership might have embraced a wider spectrum of opinion
than was actually the case. However, this is speculation; the Comintern
intervention did at the time decide the issue. 24
Kavanagh was characterised as an incurable "right deviationist". His
involvement in the timber workers' strike, his support for the union
officials during the NSW coal miners' dispute and his call for a Labor
vote in the federal and NSW elections were offered as proof. It was
indicative though, that the new leadership ignored the fact that
Kavanagh's actions had been established Comintern policy prior to the
adoption of the third period analysis. Hence, the "right deviationism"
of Kavanagh had also been advocated by those who now condemned him.
In the lead-up to the Queensland state elections in 1929 J.B. Miles,
who supported Moxon and Sharkey, advised workers: "Vote Labor at the
Federal elections as a means of registering your protest against the
nationalist Government legislation."25
He also defended unity between
communists and left wing reformists. Writing in the Workers Weekly in
April 1929, Miles criticised those "who will not work with non-Party
enemies of the capitalist class". He maintained: "Communists who insist
on pure Communist propaganda or organisation, may continue to use the
term but they cannot continue in the Party of the Communist
International, the Leninist Party".26
Commenting on the political
back-flip of the Comintern and the new CPA leadership with the adoption
of the third period line, Kavanagh claimed that attempts to make him
confess to the error of supporting Labor were "merely the saving of the
face of the ECCI at our expense".27
A number of authors have located the catalyst for the leadership
struggle within the unique circumstances of the Australian party and
the labour movement at the time.28
However, we should also see it as
part of a broader trend within the international communist movement,
which culminated in the emergence of new leaders in most parties during
the third period. This process, referred to as the "Bolshevisation" of
the communist parties, actually originated at the fifth congress of the
Comintern in 1924 following a number of embarrassing mistakes by its
Soviet leaders, particularly in Germany, and the factional dispute
between Stalin and Trotsky after Vladimir Lenin's death in 1924. Gruber
noted that in the
four years between the fifth and sixth congresses
many international parties became marginalised in their labour
movements and the "most promising national leaders had fallen into
official disgrace, and their timid, trimming, and Bolshevised
successors held the helm without a course and awaited new
directions".29
Notwithstanding this, "Bolshevisation" — the process of
turning the international parties into mirror images of the stalinised
CPSU — was rapidly accelerated after the sixth congress. Almost no
international party was exempt, including the CPA.30
"Bolshevisation"
of the CPA
One of the first acts of the Moxon leadership was to cable
the Comintern "offering unswerving loyalty to the new line".31 Its
primary task was to establish its authority over the party as the
internal dispute was not over. Kavanagh's supporters were elected to
the Sydney and NSW state committees of the party — the largest
communist bodies in Australia. Indicative of the new executive's
insecurity was its action in cabling the Comintern in January 1930
claiming that the former central committee was "trying to usurp
power".32 Then
began an unprecedented campaign of expulsions, ostracism
and banishments.
Jack Ryan, Kavanagh's political ally and friend was expelled. Leaders
of the Militant Womens' Group in Sydney who had personal and political
ties with the former leadership were dispersed throughout the
organisation. Personal attacks were also used to ostracise members. Tom
Wright, another Kavanagh supporter at the time, was apparently
"scorned" and "abused" by a fellow communist at a dance and another was
warned against continuing her friendship with Kavanagh's wife and party
member, Edna.33
Supporters elected to Sydney's district committee were either expelled
or relocated to other cities and Kavanagh was sent to Adelaide against
his wishes. He recorded in his diary on January 28, 1930, that on
arriving in Sydney from the coalfields he found a letter "instructing
me to go to Adelaide as Resident Organiser. Took letter into office and
refused. His written appeals to Moxon were rejected and he reluctantly
left for Adelaide on February 8, 1930, after being called before the
central executive.34
Kavanagh noted that one of the principal leaders of the campaign
against him was Herbert Moxon whose "dictatorial manner" offended him.
Kavanagh accused Moxon of being behind the political bureau's decision
to suspend him from all positions within the party, of preventing him
from addressing some public meetings and of finally announcing his
expulsion from he party in 1930.35
Moxon had been a member of the party since 1922, when he played an
important role in bringing the rump of the Australian Socialist Party
into the CPA.36
Unlike other former members of the Socialist Party,
Moxon remained in the CPA, becoming one of Queensland's dynamic
leaders. Throughout the 1920s he worked closely with Miles to
consolidate and build party branches in Brisbane and north
Queensland.37
He also helped recruit Ted Tripp, who was instrumental in
establishing the Townsville branch in the mid-1920s.38
In the internal party struggle in 1924 between Jock Garden's faction,
which sought to dissolve the party into the ALP, and Kavanagh's
faction, which sought to maintain the independence of the small and
beleaguered CPA, Moxon faithfully supported Kavanagh. In fact, he was
described as Kavanagh's "chief backstop".39
In a subsequent internal party dispute over the relationship between
Labor and the CPA, Moxon used undemocratic methods to ensure Kavanagh
and his supporters prevailed. He went so far as to establish bogus
Queensland branches giving Kavanagh authority at the 1927 CPA congress
to remove Norman Jeffrey, Jack Ryan, Esmonde Higgins and Lance Sharkey
from the central executive.40
The deposed leaders believed that
communists should involve themselves in the factional dispute in the
ALP between right-wing politicians and left-wing trade union officials,
while Kavanagh argued that this approach was conservative.41
Moxon was also a central figure in establishing an electoral bloc of
communist and left-wing militants against the ALP in the 1929
Queensland state election. He was appointed by the party to implement
and co-ordinate this program in southern Queensland and Miles was
appointed organiser for northern Queensland. One of the communist
candidates was Tripp who left his position in the railways to stand in
the Mundingburra electorate. Within little more than a decade Tripp
would also fall from favour with the new leadership and be expelled
from the party.
To assist the new leadership under Moxon and Sharkey, and to oversee
the party's "Bolshevisation", the Comintern dispatched an American
communist, Herbert (Harry) Moore Wicks, who was in fact a police agent.
Wicks was known to Australian communists as Herbert Moore. He arrived
on April 8, 1930, and left in July 1931.42 Under his tutelage the
leadership was shown "how to correctly deal with anyone in opposition".
Miles explained that Wicks' method was to convince the party that the
critic was "no longer fit" to be a member. "Then having undermined any
basis they may have held in the Party, then the Comrade can be easily
emptied out." Sharkey praised Wicks, saying: "he did the best work any
individual has done" in clearing up "the line and laying the basis for
work in this Party".43
Wicks' authority went unchallenged in the CPA and party members were
anxious to win his approval. One communist claimed in 1932 that: "All
the rank and file of this organisation attempted to do was what Moore
[Wicks] wanted them to do and say".44
According to Kavanagh the new
leadership was just as servile as the rank and file. Most members of
the central committee plenum in June 1930, he claimed, "kowtowed to
Wicks".45
To enhance their power the leadership established the central control
commission [CCC], which remained unaccountable to either the rank and
file or any elected organ of the party. It thoroughly scrutinised all
members' political and personal activities and disciplined them
accordingly. Tripp claimed that all critics of the leadership found
themselves before this "special police organ".46 Kavanagh, having been
called up on a number of occasions in front of the CCC, which could
"now sit in judgement upon elected bodies", commented that its
establishment reflected a growing bureaucratisation of the party.47
"Bolshevisation" was also embodied in the party's new constitution
drafted by Wicks. At the NSW conference in April 1930 a further
controversy developed when Kavanagh questioned the relevance of Wicks'
manifesto to Australian conditions. Frank Farrell contends that "from
then on Wicks took a leading part in a concerted campaign to destroy
Kavanagh's influence among CPA members".48 It was alleged that the
campaign to isolate Kavanagh even included proposals to physically
assault him. Moxon claimed that Wicks "told us to beat up Kavanagh",
but Sharkey said privately to ignore this because: "That is not
fighting politically. That is definitely personal reactions."49
Although not physically assaulted, Kavanagh was the victim of a series
of petty slights. He was sent to address meetings which had not been
organised; no party members met him at the Melbourne railway station on
his way to Adelaide; and, although he had to support his family
financially, he often had difficulty getting his pay from the party.50
After eight weeks in Adelaide Kavanagh was brought back to Sydney
because the new leadership feared his growing popularity in South
Australia. On his return to the east, Kavanagh's remaining authority
and influence was further undermined by the Moxon-Sharkey leadership.51
Although the party had experienced disputes in the past in which the
leaders of the losing faction were reviled, the persecution Kavanagh
suffered was an entirely new and different phenomenon. It is worth
noting that some members disapproved of these procedures. However, they
remained silent for fear of receiving the same treatment. Kavanagh
commented in his diary that Tripp was "not impressed with the procedure
here".52 But as
he had already alienated the leadership and had been
labelled a "right deviationist", Tripp would not voice his concerns
publicly. His "deviation" was committed at the Lenin School in Moscow.
When the Americans there treated the idea of Wicks being an envoy "as a
huge joke", Tripp queried his credentials.53 This was a grave error and
Tripp, having committed one mistake, was not prepared to make another
by criticising Kavanagh's treatment. Instead, he remained silent and
worked diligently for the CPA in this period to avoid his own expulsion
from the party. So strong was Tripp's devotion to the CPA that he later
confessed the "thought of separation ... was unbearable".54
The vendetta against Kavanagh culminated in his expulsion in 1930.
Although he rejoined in 1931, he was expelled for a second time in
1934 for once again disagreeing with the leadership. From this he
concluded:
We are indeed coming to a
peculiar pass in the development of the
revolutionary movement when it becomes a crime to think differently
than the leadership. This surely brings us to the position of the
concept of infallibility, which in turn leads to god. This is in total
opposition to anything that Marx or Lenin ever enunciated. 55 Fellow
communist Jean Devanny whose personal life was criticised by the
leadership, observed that "the sanctity of leaders was an obsession.
The most commonplace individuals, on being elevated to leadership, were
supposed to become magically invested with an immunity to mistakes and
therefore to stand above criticism". 56
The "infallibility" of the leadership was reinforced by the mania for
self-criticism. It was argued that self-criticism ensured that
"party membership and the various organisations of the party from the
highest to the lowest are the guardians of the line of the party".57
What it actually meant was that blame for the failure of any policies
could be shifted from the leadership to individual members.
Self-criticism became so important that even the failure to engage in
it to the satisfaction of the leadership brought punishment, as
political bureau member J. Shelley discovered in 1931.
The central committee had decreed that communists must hold their own
May Day rally on May 1, 1931, separate from the official ALP-trade
union
rally called for May 4. When Shelley and Charlie Nelson, a candidate
for the political bureau, also attended the official rally they were
accused of "right opportunist resistance". Nelson had his endorsement
for general secretary of the Miners Federation withdrawn by the CPA and
Shelley was expelled from the party for acting "in an impermissible way
when the political bureau called upon him for self-criticism".58
The CCC made it clear that self-criticism did not mean unbridled
criticism of the leadership. It warned:
if stupid individuals think that
this means a license to slander the
party leadership, to help the boss to weaken the party, then it will
just be an unfortunate experience for them because they will be outside
the party and exposed before the workers with the contempt which all
enemies of the party are treated. 59
With some insight Kavanagh surmised
that self-criticism was "intended primarily for those who do not kowtow
to the CEC".60
The authority of the leadership remained unchallenged as internal
democracy and genuine debate in the party press declined. And this
process was augmented by the failure to hold regular party congresses.
Full implementation of the third period theory — "left
sectarianism"
under Moxon and Sharkey
With the "right deviationists" defeated, general secretary Moxon was
eager to thoroughly implement the third period line. Believing that the
coming period would be one of revolution, the leadership speculated
that even small strikes and lockouts could develop into mass political
struggles. The "social fascist" union officials, incapable of leading
any dispute to the benefit of workers, would be swept aside, their
leadership usurped by rank and file militants under communist MMM
control.
On the northern NSW coal fields, in the closing months of the 1929
miners' strike, the party's new central committee, while believing a
general strike in the coal industry was necessary, also issued a
bulletin calling on miners to arm themselves. The leadership instructed
Esmonde Higgins, who was sent to direct CPA work on the coalfields
seven weeks before the strike collapsed, to prevent the miners' union
leaders from addressing the mass meeting where it was expected they
would call for a return to work. The central committee, under Moxon,
demanded "that any means, including violence, was to be used" to ensure
the officials did not speak.61
William Orr, elected president of the
miners' union in 1934, claimed that Moxon "played a leading part in
working out tactics" in the coalfields and he even proposed seizing
the coal mining town of Cessnock.62
Such extreme measures increased once the Comintern agent and police
informant Wicks arrived in Australia in April 1930. In Broken Hill the
party prepared for what Moxon later called a putsch. According to E.
Docker who, with Moxon, Wicks and Walker, constituted the party
secretariat in 1930:
A communication came through from
the centre, pointing out that we
should broaden the struggle, seize the police station, the railway
station, and all strategic positions in Broken Hill, and take complete
control of the town. I perfectly agreed with the directions in the
letter sent across; (sic) The only thing that had me worried was that I
could see terrible difficulties in carrying it out. 63
Docker also admitted that communists in Adelaide "tried to put the town
in darkness in order to stop every shop in Port Adelaide",64 and Tripp
claimed Wicks proposed blowing up a bridge there.65 Many leaders,
including Tripp and Nelson attributed these "amazing proposals" to
Wicks.66 In
fact, Nelson claimed Wicks was so confident that a general
strike was imminent he believed "it would be possible to stop the
tramways, powerhouses, etc, to take the Labor Daily printery and
publish a paper".67
In hindsight these activities seem absurd, yet they merely reflected
the enormous faith the leadership had in the radical pronouncements
emanating from Moscow. In 1929 Molotov, who had replaced Bukharin as
head of the Comintern, claimed that only a "dull opportunist" or a
"sorry liberal" would deny that "tremendous revolutionary events of
international significance" were developing in both the west and east.
It was also asserted in 1929 that there was a "deepening of the
processes of the leftward turn and radicalisation of the masses, which
presently is growing into the beginning of a revolutionary upsurge".68
Comintern disapproval
In 1930 Lance Sharkey and William Orr arrived in Moscow for the fifth
congress of the Red International of Trade Unions [Profintern or RILU]
to be held in August. They believed they would be commended for
removing the "right deviationists", for "Bolshevising" the party and
implementing the third period line under the guidance of Wicks. Sharkey
reported: "we got over there and presented our reports to Moscow and in
detail gave them all of these episodes, romantic things we had been
engaged in the firm believe (sic) that we were worthy of praise".69
This was not to be. Events in the German Communist Party had forced a
moderation of the Comintern line. When in February 1930 some of its
leadership publicly predicted revolutionary upheavals Stalin became
alarmed, afraid that these pronouncements might jeopardise the fragile
trading relations between the USSR and Germany. Within the Comintern a
"new note of caution" developed along with "a reluctance to embark on
action which might lead to clashes with German authorities, and
exacerbate Soviet-German relations at a critical moment". At an
enlarged plenum of the ECCI from February 8-28, 1930, communists were
warned to guard against "opportunism ... concealed in revolutionary
phrases". The next month Stalin advocated "a struggle on two fronts —
both against those who lag behind and against those who rush ahead". By
the 16th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
June 1930 the international parties were being advised against
"left-sectarianism" which, E.H. Carr noted, "evidently consisted in an
undue eagerness to translate revolutionary words into revolutionary
action".70
Two months later, when Sharkey and Orr arrived at the Profintern
congress, they discovered they were "entirely out of line" with
Comintern thought. Its Soviet leadership ridiculed the CPA's activities
during the NSW miners strike, especially the party's call for workers
to arm themselves. Orr recalled:
in relation to the Defence Army
when it was discussed, we stated that
there were over 2000 in the Northern coalfields, and that they were in
a position to arm most of them. Vassiloff? (sic) just laughed and said
what do you think they were going to do with them ... We were thrashed
very severly (sic) on these questions ... 71
Initially Sharkey defended the extreme actions of the party, arguing
that "in England they could have peaceful demonstrations and so on, but
if we participated in a strike or demonstration in Australia, we were
batoned and even shot". Although police had used weapons against
waterside workers, miners and unemployed, Moscow dismissed these
rationalisations and reprimanded the CPA.72
On returning to Australia Sharkey discussed the situation with Wicks
and the secretariat. In a central committee document, which has been
censored by an unidentified source, Moxon stated:
At the time I was under
instructions to procure [censored] and Sharkey
told me and I agreed with him, that it was wrong. I did not want to get
these [censored] — I squibbed it. It was not that I was frightened
personally — I was just to give the orders and others would do the job,
but I did not think procuring of [censored] would assist the working
class. 73
While it was unanimously decided to abandon the more extreme plans,
conflict arose over the leadership's attitude to Wicks. It was
recognised that he had certain "left sectarian" tendencies although,
when informed of the Profintern's criticisms, Wicks claimed to have
reached similar conclusions independently. The majority of the
secretariat agreed that the best way to handle Wicks' inclination in
"favour of too drastic steps" was to simply oppose any extreme
suggestions he made.
Moxon disagreed and wanted to inform Moscow of Wicks' extremism. But
Sharkey objected, believing that "the difficulty could be got over
without disturbing the party". In fact, he continued to defend Wicks
long after he had left Australia, saying in 1932: "I ... pay tribute to
Comrade Moore [Wicks] for the work he did in this country, he did the
best work any individual has done in ... laying the basis for work in
this Party".74
Sharkey judged that the source of "left sectarianism" lay in the youth
and inexperience of the leadership, which was "taking responsibility in
the Party practically for the first time".75 However, the leadership's
strong belief in the approaching revolution led it inexorably to
radical activities. Although there was abundant discussion of "left
sectarianism" within the leadership, no-one questioned the underlying
assumptions of the third period, which had led them to these
conclusions. For example, in January 1931 Tripp claimed that "in the
very near future we will have sufficient strength to win the streets
despite the Police force and the assistance they obtain from the Trade
Union leaders.76
Four months later, leaders of NSW's district 1
stressed that "the world situation was sharpening so rapidly that the
question of power may face the Australian working class in the course
of the next period".77
Conflict between Moxon and Wicks
Shortly after the secretariat's discussion of the Profintern's
criticisms, constant disagreements arose between Wicks and Moxon. From
this time, Moxon asserted, Wicks initiated a campaign to undermine his
credibility with the membership and criticisms of Moxon began to be
raised within the leadership. Then, early in 1931 Moxon was accused of
"right deviationism".78
While in Melbourne he alienated much of the membership with his
heavyhanded approach — Sharkey alleged that Moxon wanted to expel
half the branch.79
When the CPA called a general strike for February
9, 1931 — a "fake general strike" according to Moxon — he alleged that
the
leadership of the Unemployed Workers Movement [UWM], without his
authorisation, formed an alliance with a trades hall-backed
organisation. The groups were involved in a further joint demonstration
on March 6. Because Moxon decided not to dissolve the alliance until
after March 6, he was accused of being a "conscious distorter of the CI
[Comintern] line".80
In the Workers Weekly the
secretariat accused him
of tying "the Melbourne unemployed to the social fascist machine headed
by Don Cameron and Monk".81
Wicks was sent to Melbourne by the leadership to encourage Moxon to
participate in self-criticism and Moxon was temporarily replaced as
general secretary by Docker, until the party congress. Admitting his
error, Moxon stated:
The basis of my mistake is Right
opportunism based on an
overestimation of the present period — the preparedness of the
bourgeoisie ... and an underestimation of the radicalisation and
preparedness of the masses to follow our independent leaders. 82
It was the Melbourne events that, Docker claimed, "really started the
breach between the P.B. and Comrade Moxon".83
After arriving back in Sydney prior to the tenth party congress in
April 1931, Moxon was called before the political bureau, where he and
Wicks had another altercation. At the congress Moxon was elected to the
political bureau and the organisational bureau and was made organiser
for district 1. Despite his election to leadership bodies, Wicks had
already begun the process of convincing the party that Moxon was no
longer fit to be a member as a prelude to "easily emptying him out".
When criticisms were raised against Moxon he did not defend himself. As
he explained to a friend and fellow communist, he did this in the
interests of party unity: "I poor fish accepted this in silence
thinking it was for 'unity' (... believe me there are some crimes
committed in the name of Unity)."84
While organiser for district 1, a series of censure motions over
trivial issues were passed against him. Moxon asserted that Wicks and
the political bureau "continually flogged me until I became silent".85
According to Moxon he was one of the few leading members of the party
who were sceptical of Wicks' extreme proposals regarding anti-eviction
struggles. From censored central committee documents it appears that in
the Sydney suburb of Bankstown in June 1931 communists prepared for an
armed confrontation with the police to prevent the eviction of a
returned soldier who was behind in his rent.
Communist militants involved in the dispute were assured that 1000
returned soldiers in the neighbourhood "were so incensed that they were
prepared to offer [censored] resistance". It was reported that they had
access to "electrified barbed wire, and sandbags and so on" to fortify
the house against a police assault and were "prepared to back up the
eviction fighters in an open struggle against the police". The CPA
leadership was excited by the prospect and Orr claimed that the
involvement of the returned soldiers would accelerate the struggle in
Bankstown "even to [censored] clash with the police". He explained:
In this period we had been
carrying on and mobilising large numbers of
workers against these eviction fights, and these evictions were being
carried on by the social fascist Lang Labor government. We were
concerned about chrystallising (sic) and dramatising the situation in
such a way as to draw the attention of all workers to the
anti-working-class action of the Lang government. 86
It transpired, however, that the local support was grossly
overestimated. Instead of the 1000 men expected, only 16 attempted to
defend the house. The smallness of their numbers sparked a dispute over
what tactics to use, prompting some to see the futility of any armed
confrontation. The weapon/weapons were removed from the house without
the leadership's sanction and Moxon claimed that Wicks demanded to know
who had given this order, threatening to "immediately move their
expulsion". However, as it was "never discovered who ordered [censored]
to be taken out of the house at Bankstown ... nobody was expelled".
Defending Wicks, Orr said it "was not a question of expulsion for
removing [censored] but expulsion for a deliberate breach on the
question of the P.B. decision."87
Eventually a large squad of armed police forced their way into the
house, shooting two occupants in the process. After searching the 16
anti-eviction fighters for weapons and burning their possessions, the
police arrested them.88
The following month a similar anti-eviction struggle developed at
Guilford. Moxon claimed that "all kinds of instructions were sent out,
people were sent down the South Coast to get [censored] and so on".
Then the matter came up on the
District Committee ... it was raised
that such tactics would bring about a reign of white terror. Comrade
Mountjoy came from District (South Coast) where [censored] had come
from, and he raised the question. I raised the matter also; for raising
it I was censured.
It was discovered that the same line to Bankstown was being carried out
— a few men in the house and a few on the outside if possible. They
were to use [censored] only if they had a good getaway, an underground
tunnel or something. 89
While it was apparent that there were problems with this approach,
no-one on the leadership would criticise Wicks. On the contrary,
leaders later praised him extensively. Docker claimed he "did wonderful
work while he was out here" and Nelson declared he had "done a
considerable amount for this Party, both politically and
organisationally".90
While not criticising Wicks, the Workers
Weekly in
July 1931 did state that in anti-eviction struggles "it is wrong to
assume that every house must be turned into a fortress". The urgent
task for communists was instead to develop a mass campaign against
evictions.91
The consequences of "Bolshevisation" — Moxon scapegoated
The CPA leadership must have found itself in somewhat of a dilemma. The
Comintern had instructed a cessessation of "left sectarianism", yet its
own envoy in Australia was the most ardent advocate of such actions.
Wicks' departure from Australia in July 1931 ended this dilemma: the
actions could cease and a ready excuse was available that would leave
the Comintern, its envoy and most of the leadership unblemished. Since
Moxon was already under a cloud for his clashes with Wicks (ironically
for questioning Wicks' "left sectarianism"), after his departure from
Australia the campaign against Moxon intensified to such an extent that
he appealed for Comintern intervention on his behalf in September 1931.
However, unlike 1929, this did not happen. Rather, his communication
with Moscow precipitated moves in Australia to take him off the
leadership.
Having being accused of "right deviationism" in Melbourne at the
beginning of 1931, Moxon was also charged with "left sectarianism"
while engaged as organiser for district 1. The CCC, accused him of
"breathing brimstone and fire at one moment, then swinging to the
opposite extreme of complete capitulation before danger". They warned
that such behaviour from a leading member was "a menace to the
well-being of the party".92
It was claimed that Moxon failed to consolidate the growing membership
of district 1 and also failed to take seriously the MMM, renamed the
Minority Movement [MM] in 1931. At the district conference on November
21-27,
1931, it was noted that there had been an extraordinary growth
in the names on the party roll from a mere 215 in 1930 to 1550 by
November 1931. Despite these impressive statistics, the district
committee admitted that "692 have never been brought into the Party".
As well, less than 19 per cent of the membership were employed, yet
"some 65-70 per cent of the workers are still in industry, and our
figures should show somewhere around the same proportion" of party
members. It was considered crucially important that the district
organise factory nuclei as the outcome of anticipated upheavals hinged
on this. It was stated that without them:
all our slogans, such as "Turning
imperialist war into civil war", "The
defence of the Soviet Union", "The counter-offensive against
capitalism's attack", become mere empty words without any serious
possibility of turning them into actuality. 93
Orr, national secretary of the MM, claimed Moxon's lack of interest in
this body was reflected in the small number of party members who were
workers and in the disorder of the existing factory cells.94
Despite the central committee's criticisms of Moxon, the problems they
outlined were not unique to district 1. During this period the CPA
found it easier to recruit members than to hold them. It was admitted
in January 1932 that while around 900 people joined the CPA between
June and July 1931, most "were no sooner won than lost for the Party".
Other districts also featured worker-members in a minority. In
Queensland only 28 per cent of members were employed in January 1932.95
At the national MM conference in January 1932, Orr complained of the
fragility of the organisation in all districts. He maintained that
members' inexperience led to the isolation of the MM and "prevented us
coming to the fore as leaders in the struggles and demonstrations of
the workers".96
Clearly, the problems facing the MM could not be the
result of poor performance of one member in district 1.
Nonetheless, on January 2, 1932, Moxon was put on "trial" by the
central committee. Accused of being a poor organiser, of creating a
financial mess for the party to sort out, of "cowardice" for
criticising Wicks, of not engaging in self-criticism constructively and
of "treachery" for writing to Moscow, he was expelled from the central
committee. Docker, who had been in the secretariat with Moxon in 1930,
stated: "We have reached a period that in order that the Party should
go ahead, it is well that you were removed. It would be a calamity if
you were ever restored to your former position."97
Moxon was blamed for instigating many of the "left sectarian"
activities the party had been involved in up to the time of Wicks'
departure. It was stated that Moxon was the "prime mover in surrounding
Cessnock, months before Comrade Moore [Wicks] came to this country. We
were going to seize Cessnock".98
While Moxon's part in these episodes
cannot be denied, he was nonetheless part of a leadership which, to a
person, believed these tactics to be correct at the time. Yet at the
central committee meeting in January 1932 one former colleague after
another blamed him for many of the activities organised and directed by
the whole leadership. On the Bankstown anti-eviction struggle Moxon
claimed:
Only I opposed line ... and
characterised them as romanticism, got
severely condemned as coward etc. Well eventually correctness of my
opposition shown — then instead of a bit of self-criticism on part of
romanticists I was blamed ... I opposed the idea of barbed wire etc and
16 men fighting the State and as mentioned above got "coward" thrown at
me. I loyally and intelligently carried out instructions EVEN THO (sic)
I KNEW THEY WERE WRONG. 99
Although the "Bolshevisation" of the party
gave exaggerated authority and prestige to the leadership, it contained
within it a contradiction. The "infallibility" of the leadership was
being promoted precisely at a time when the party had embraced the very
fallible Comintern theory of imminent revolution and the conversion of
the union bureaucracy and the labour parties to "social fascism".
Because the theory's underlying assumptions were inaccurate, the
leadership's predictions and expectations of both party members and
also the working class, could not be realised. This then placed the
leadership in a predicament. They could not admit that their strategies
had been incorrect otherwise their "infallibility" would be in
jeopardy. They therefore sought to resolve this dilemma by blaming
their mistakes, errors or miscalcualtions — even though they arose
directly from the Comintern theory — on individual leaders or party
members.
Hence Moxon, after championing the "Bolshevisation" of the party,
became its victim. He concluded from his experience of being "tried" in
1932 by his former colleagues on the central committee, that: "any
errors committed, always someone else is blamed for them — never the
collective leadership."100
Consequences of "Bolshevisation"
Of most interest in the events surrounding Moxon's removal from the
central committee was the extent to which communists had come to
believe that democratic debate within the party was destructive. Moxon
would not discuss the charges against him with the rank and file or
even with elected bodies, other than the secretariat. When resigning as
organiser for district 1 in October 1931, he told the district
committee that economic reasons compelled his resignation. In a more
candid letter to the secretariat he admitted that "members of the PB
[political bureau] know that there is much more behind the matter than
could possibly be stated to the DC".101
Moxon also stated that he would
defend himself against the charges, but that he would not take the
dispute to the rank and file and would "not raise it anywhere else but
here on the PB and with Moscow".102
The central leadership, however, had ordered him not to involve the
Russians. When he defied this ban in September 1931, Miles and Sharkey
accused him of treachery and even Moxon admitted he had "committed an
awful crime" by doing this. Sharkey, who owed his position to
intervention from Moscow, protested that Moxon's actions indicated he:
wants the crockery smashed,
busted up, wants fights and brawls and
faction wars carried on in the Party ... I say he acted from his own
point of view stupidly, and from the point of view of the Communist
Party, acted in an absolutely impermissible manner.
Sharkey insisted: "Individuals cannot communicate with individuals
anywhere outside of Australia, to Moscow or anywhere else except
through official organs". But as Moxon explained, apart from involving
Moscow his only other option was "to convince the PB, and I could not
do that".103
At his "trial" in January 1932 it was unanimously resolved to expel
Moxon from the central committee. After being a leading and active
member of the party almost from its foundation, Moxon was declared
incompetent. Former colleagues accused him of being "one of the most
irresponsible individuals that I have met in my life"; "absolutely
incapable of consistent effort for any given time"; and declared unfit
"to be an organiser of the Communist Party — an organiser for the
revolution, he lacks hard, persistent effort ...".104
In 1934 Ted Tripp, who had voted in favour of Moxon's expulsion, was by
then himself out of the party. He believed that the changes which the
CPA had undergone through its "Bolshevisation" — the development of an
"infallible" leadership, the demise of democratic debate and the
expulsion of opponents — had profoundly altered the nature of the
party. Tripp commented that the "party leadership looks upon the party
as a machine whose sinlessness is to be defended by measures of
repression and expulsion, instead of a complicated organism which, like
all living things, develops in contradictions".105
Being removed from the central committee, however, did not end Moxon's
difficulties with the leadership. The CCC printed a report on his party
activities in May 1932 claiming he had not attended several meetings.
It stated that Moxon had therefore "carried on a systematic campaign of
sabotage inside the party by leaving his posts at a most critical
period".106 A
subsequent article by the CCC in July announced his
expulsion from the party. The catalyst for this decision was Moxon's
unapproved trip to north Queensland.
His expulsion may not have come as a surprise to Moxon as he indicated
as early as September 1931 that he expected such a fate. To a friend he
said: "I write now ... while I can still do so as a CPer".107 The CCC
stated that when a person such as Moxon begins to deviate from the
Comintern line "it must inevitably end in the person so doing being
excluded from the party, and he just as inevitably, must go the way of
all enemies of the party into the camp of the enemy".108
This prediction, like the Conmintern's one of imminent revolution,
remained unfulfilled. In fact, only a month after his expulsion
Queensland police reported that Moxon was "endeavouring to collect
funds for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance for John McCormack,
Badden Bennett and James Hill.109
These men were being defended by the
CPA for their part in resisting the eviction of unemployed workers from
Parramatta Park in Cairns. The party had even sent their
barrister-member Fred Paterson to north Queensland to defend them in
court. After the party abandoned the third period theory Edgar Ross
attempted unsuccessfully to recruit Moxon back into the party.110
CPA moderation of third period theory
Following Moxon's removal, the Miles-Sharkey leadership began to steer
the party on a more moderate course. Kavanagh noted in December 1931
that the mood of the meetings had changed. "The tone was much improved
as compared with previous similar meetings. The Moxon style ... is no
longer in order". In April 1932 he again noted that "the tone of the
discussion was by far the best of any of the Party conferences. The
attitude is a complete removal of the Moxon-Moore (Wicks) policy now
recognised as erroneous".111
However, even if the tone of the meetings
had changed, the underlying problems of dictatorial rule from the
centre, the "infallibility" of the leadership and absolute loyalty to
Moscow, remained.
When the Comintern held its seventh and final congress in mid-1935 it
abandoned the third period theory. Pronouncements that there could be
no fourth period because the third would end in revolution, were
forgotten. Rather than the third period being one of proletarian
revolutions, it was a period which saw the rise and consolidation of
fascism and militarism. The Comintern's new theory,
the popular front, demanded alliances between communist and reformist
parties in the struggle against fascism. This must have come as a
surprise to German communists, many of whom were now in Nazi gaols.
During the third period the Comintern had repeatedly warned them
against any alliance with the reformists and had insisted that
the German communists "concentrate fire on the Social-Fascists" rather
than the fascists.112
The CPA adopted the popular front at its eleventh congress in 1935, and
implemented it as eagerly as it had the third period theory. During the
1937 federal elections, despite constant rebuffs from the ALP, the
party published an astonishing number of leaflets and pasted up
thousands of posters calling for support for Labor.113 Gil Roper, a
party leader until 1937, claimed that "members were directed to lend
full and unconditional support to the Labor politicians. In the
electorate of J.A. Beasley, a bitter anti-Communist, the Party
members even posted up a record number of posters supporting him!"
Roper then asked if the "line of the Kavanagh leadership was 'crass
right oppmtmism', what must we say of the 1937 Federal Election policy
and tactic of the Miles leadership?"114
The fact that the leadership
could perform such astonishing political somersaults without provoking
any major internal dissent from the rank and file indicated the extent
to which the party had become thoroughly "Bolshevised".
Conclusion
Moxon and Sharkey owed their victory to intervention by the Comintern
and their authority over the party was further secured under the
guidance of its its envoy Harry Wicks. The leadership's control over
members was strengthened, particularly with the establishment of the
Central Control Commission, which supervised and disciplined members,
ensuring absolute loyalty to the leadership's policies.
Open discussion in the press and at party meetings was curtailed. No
genuine debate was tolerated and critics of the leadership were either
expelled, discredited or disciplined. In 1935 Ted Tripp, claimed:
Instead of the party policy being
hammered out through the conflict of
ideas, as in the past, the thinking is now done by the secretarial
hierarchy. Not only is one not allowed to present a difference of
opinion ... but the holding of any such difference of opinion is
branded as heretical, and the individual concerned is designated as a
"counter-revolutionary" a "disruptor" — and is expelled! 115
Party congresses, which had been annual events, were held less
frequently. After the new leadership took control at the CPA's ninth
congress in December 1929, another was not held until April 1931 when
Herbert Moxon was replaced as general secretary. Then no more were
called until the dramatic change in the party's theory and practice
with the adoption of the popular front in 1935.
The first two years of the Moxon-Sharkey leadership significantly
altered the internal dynamics of the party, turning it into an
organisation that obediently adopted the policies of the Comintern no
matter how inappropriate or contradictory they may have been. The
changes were not unique to the CPA, but were part of a broader trend
within the international communist movement in the late 1920s and early
1930s, which saw the demise of its more critically thinking leaders and
their replacement with people prepared to be subservient to Moscow.
Notes
1. J.D. Blake, The
Australian Communist Party and
the Comintern in the early 1930s, Labour History, no.23 (November
1972); Barbara Curthoys, The Communist Party and the Communist
International (1927-29), Labour
History, no. 64 (May 1993); Stuart
Macintyre, Dealing with Moscow: The
Comintern and the early history of
the Communist Party of Australia, Labour History, no.67 (November
1994).
2. Quoted in Militant, no.
15 (February 1936), 15
3. Quoted in Militant, no.
15 (February 1936), 15
4. Tony Cliff and Donny
Gluckstein, Marxism and trade
union struggle: the general strike of 1926, London, 1986, 280;
Julian
Symons, The general strike: an
historical portrait, London, 1959, 225
5. Harold Isaacs, The
tragedy of the Chinese
revolution, Stanford, 1961, 299
6. E.H. Carr and R.W.
Davies, Foundations of a planned
economy, 1926-1929, vol. 1, Harmondsworth, 1974, 69
7. Michael Haynes, Nikolai
Bukharin and the
transition from capitalism to socialism, London, 1985
8. Helmut Gruber, Soviet
Russia masters the
Comintern: international communism in the era of Stalin's ascendancy,
New York, 1975, 176
9. Isaac Deutscher, The
prophet unarmed: Trotsky
1921-1929, Oxford, 1987, 148
10. E.H. Carr, Twilight of
the Comintern, 1930-35,
London, 1982, 4
11. Jane Degras (ed), The
Communist International
1919-1943, vol.3, London, 1965, 446
12. Leon Trotsky, The
challenge of the left
opposition (1928-29), New York, 1981, 252-253
13. Workers
Weekly, no.281
(11 January 1929), 4
14.
Workers Weekly, no.281
(11 January 1929), 4
15. Curthoys, Communist
Party and the Communist
International, 62
16. Quoted in Curthoys, Communist Party and the
Communist International, 62
17. Quoted in Curthoys, Communist Party and
Communist International, 63
18. Quoted in Alastair
Davidson, The Communist Party
of Australia: A Short History, Stanford, 1969, 51
19.
Workers Weekly, no.321
(25 October 1929), 3
20.
Workers Weekly, no.321
(25 October 1929), 3
21.
Workers Weekly, no.324 (15 November 1929), 3;
Davidson, 51
22. Gerard Dalton, The Queensland labour movement,
1919-1929: a social, political and administrative analysis, B.A.
(Hons), University of Queensland, History Department, 1974, 188-189
23. Trotsky, Challenge of the left opposition,
202
24. Blake, Australian
Communist Party, 44
25.
Workers Weekly, no.271 (19 October 1928), 3
26.
Workers Weekly, no.292 (5 April 1928), 3
27. Jack Kavanagh, Diary, 22 June 1930, Noel
Butlin
Archives Centre [NBAC], Australian National University, Jack Kavanagh
Collection, Z400, Box 1
28. Frank Farrell, International socialism and
Australian labour: the left in Australia, 1919-29, Sydney, 1981;
Macintyre, 'Dealing with Moscow'
29. Gruber, Soviet Russia masters the Comintern,
176
30. Carr, Twilight,
5
31. Quoted in Curthoys, Communist Party and the
Communist International, 66
32. Davidson, Communist Party of Australia; 51
33. Audrey Johnson, Bread and roses: a personal
history of three militant women and their friends 1902-1988,
Sutherland (NSW), 1990, 26-27
34. Kavanagh's diary, 28 January 1930
35. Kavanagh's diary 24 October 1930; 10 and
24
November 1930; 24 December 1930
36. Sydney Branch (ASP) Minutes, 1922,
61-65,
Mitchell Library (Sydney), Communist Party of Australia Records
1945-1967, MSS.2389 Box 1(8)
37. Australian
Communist, vol. 1, no. 11 (4 March
1921), 5
38. Ted Tripp interview with J.
Normington-Rawling,
transcript, ANU, NBAC, Normington-Rawling Collection, N57/109
39. Blake, Australian
Communist Party and the
Comintern, 40
40. Closed Session Central Committee Plenum,
2
January 1932, 18, Australian Archives (ACT), Communist
Party-NSW-Discipline, CRS/A6335/1: 31; Blake, Australian Communist
Party and the Comintern, 41
41. Curthoys, Communist
Party and the Communist
International, 57-58
42. Macintyre, Dealing with Moscow, 141
43. Closed session, 24 and 9
44. Closed session, 19 and 20
45. Kavanagh's diary, 29 June 1930
46.
Militant, July 1934), 6
47. Kavanagh's diary, 12 May 1930
48. Farrell, International socialism and Australian
labour, 182
49. Closed session, 22
50. See Kavanagh's diary, numerous entries
throughout
1930
51. Johnson, Bread and roses, 52
52. Kavanagh's diary, 7 August 1930
53. Tripp
interview, 1-2
54.
Militant, July 1935, 6
55.
Workers Weekly, no.559 (29 June 1934), 4
56. Jean Devanny, Point of departure: the
autobiography of Jean Devanny, St Lucia, 1986, 159
57.
Workers Weekly, no.450 (13 May 1932), 2
58. Plenary Session No. 1 District
Committee, May
1931, 1-2, Australian Archives (NSW), C320/Pl: CIB 631
59.
Workers Weekly, no.450 (13 May 1932), 2
60. Kavanagh's diary, 23 May 1930
61. Blake, Australian
Communist Party and the
Comintern, 45
62. Closed session, 9 and 14
63. Closed session, 5 and 12
64. Closed session, 12
65. Tripp interview, 2
66. Tripp interview, 2
67. Closed session, 19
68. Quoted in Leon Trotsky, Writings 1930, New
York,
1978, 52
69. Closed session, 7
70. Carr, Twilight,
16-19
71. Closed session, 7 and 9-10
72. Closed session, 7
73. Closed session, 5
74. Closed session, 7 and 9
75. Closed session, 7
76.
Workers Weekly, no.318 (9 January 1931), 4
77. Plenary Session No. 1 District
Committee, May
1931, 7
78. Closed session, 5
79. Closed session, 8
80. H.J. Moxon to Frank, 2 September 1931,
1,
Australian Archives (ACT), Communist Party-NSW-Discipline, CRS/A6335/1:
31
81.
Workers Weekly, no.447 (22 April 1932), 2
82.
Workers Weekly, no. 447 (22 April 1932), 2
83. Closed session, 12
84. Moxon to "Frank", 1
85. Closed session, 5
86. Closed session, 2; 4
and 10
87. Closed session., 2 and 53 and 10
88.
Workers Weekly, no.405 (26 june 1931), 1
89. Closed session, 5
90. Closed session, 9 and 19
91.
Workers Weekly, no.410 (31 July 1931), 4
92. Workers
Weekly, no.461 (29 July
1932), 2
93.
Workers Weekly, no. 411 (27 November 1931), 2
94. Closed session, 11
95. Workers Weekly, no. 433 (15
January, 1932), 2
96. Red
Leader, 15 January 1932, 5
97. Closed session, 13
98. Closed session, 14
99. Moxon to "Frank", 1 and 2
100. Closed session, 6
101. Letter from Moxon, District Organiser,
to Secretariat, 20 October
1931, Australian Archives (ACT), Communist Party-NSW-Discipline,
CRS/A6335/1: 31
102. Closed session, 23
103. Closed session, 4, 9 and 23
104. Closed session, 12, 31, 18 and 26
105.
Militant, no.10 (July 1934), 6
106. Workers
Weekly, no. 450 (13 May 1932), 2
107.
Moxon to "Frank", 1
108.
Workers Weekly,
no.461 (29 July 1932), 2
109. Inspector of Police (Cairns) to
Commissioner of Police, 22
August
1932, Queensland State Archives (Brisbane), Premiers Department, PRE/A,
In-Letter 5599 of 1932
110. Edgar Ross interviewed by Beris
Penrose, 9 October 1991,
transcript in possession of author
111. Kavanagh's diary, 5 December 1931 and
22 April 1932
112. Isaac Deutscher, The
prophet outcast: Trotsky,
1929-1940, Oxford, 1987, 131
113. Davidson, Communist
Party of Australia, 76
114. Gil Roper, What is Happening In the Communist
Party?
115.
Militant, (July 1935), 7
From Labour History, No. 70, May 1996
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